Hegel, Faith, and Knowledge

I stayed up far into the night rereading the introduction to Hegel’s “Lectures on the Philosophy of World History”. I was tempted to put the book back on the bookshelf several times after arriving at passages such as the following:

A distinction is often made between faith and knowledge, and the two have come to be commonly accepted as opposites. It is taken for granted that they are different, and that we therefore have no knowledge of God. People are affronted if we tell them that we seek to know and understand God, and to impart such knowledge to others. But if it is defined correctly, the distinction between faith and knowledge is in fact an empty one. For if I have faith in something, I also know it and am convinced of it. In religion, we have faith in God and in the doctrines which explain his nature more fully; but this is something we know and of which we are certain. To know means to have something as an object of one’s consciousness and to be certain of it; and it is exactly the same with faith.

My initial reaction is that he is entirely wrong, or painted himself into a corner from which it will be difficult for him to escape. Then I try to explain to myself why he is wrong about the identity of faith and knowledge, and my initial reaction does not seem quite so handsome.

So, I press on with my reading and thinking until it is nearly daylight, at which point, I ask myself, what the Hell is wrong with you, Lynn?